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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the dynamic relationships between ten stock
exchanges of the euro zone using Granger causal networks. Considering
returns for which we allow the variance to follow a Markov-Switching
GARCH or a Changing-Point GARCH process, we rst show that over
di¤erent periods, the topology of the network is highly unstable. In partic-
ular dynamic relationships vanish over very recent years. Then, expanding
on this idea, we analyze patterns of information transmission within the
network. Using rolling windows to study networkstopology in terms of
information clustering, we nd that the nodesstate changes continually.
Moreover, the system exhibits periods of ickering in information trans-
mission. During these periods of ickering, the system also exhibits desyn-
chronization in the information transmission process. These periods do
precede tipping points or phase transitions on the market, especially before
the global nancial crisis, and can thus be used as early warnings. To our
knowledge, this is the rst time that ickering in information transmission
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is identied on nancial markets, and that ickering is related to phase
transitions.
Keywords: Causal Networks ; Topology ; Flickering ; Desynchronisa-
tion ; Phase Transitions.
JEL codes: C1, C4, G1.
1 Introduction
Consider an electronic component designed to emit a signal which is about to
fail, that is about to switch from one state to an other. This component is likely
to start emitting abnormal signals, or signals in an abnormal way before the
failure, rather than abruptly failing. For instance, we are likely to observe a
ickering signal before a phase transition occurs. Consider further the compo-
nent as part of an electronic device, which is connected to other components,
forming then a complex interdependent dynamic system. Two questions then
arise: i) What will be the impact of the components failure on the whole sys-
tem? In other words, will the electronic device fail because of the failure of one
component ? and ii) Is it possible to know in advance that a failure will occur ?
One way to answer the rst question is to look at the integrated circuit of the
device (i.e. the topology) and to focus on the importance of the component in
terms of centrality and/or the number of components connected to it (i.e. the
degree). To answer the second question, one rst needs to recover the topology
of the system, and next to look at the information di¤usion processes (i.e. the
signals) so as to identify abnormal periods prior to the failure at the individual
and/or the macro level (i.e. component versus circuit level).
Turning to nancial systems and systemic risk, the rst question has been
adressed by a number of authors using networks. Relating systemic risk to
the concepts of connectedness, contagion, and therefore di¤usion of exogenous
and/or endogenous shocks within and/or across nancial sectors (see Bisias et
al. 2012), Allen and Gale (2000) as well as Acemoglu et al. (2013) show that
highly interconnected networks are more resilient to small shocks but not to
large ones. Battiston et al. (2013) focus on the frailty of nodes, and then study
cascading e¤ects as Motter and Lai (2002) do. In such models, the focus is
set on the impact of the failure of one or several nodes on the whole system.
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Furthermore, Hackett et al. (2011) and Payne et al. (2009) emphasize the
importance of networkstopology while studying clustered and degree-correlated
networks respectively.
Our paper clearly relates to the second question, that is on early warning
indicators prior to a phase transition (i.e. non-crisis versus crisis periods). We
consider nancial systems as being possibly critically self-organized (Bak et al.,
1987, Bianconi and Marsili, 2004). In particular, local interrelations between
the systems components build up a coordinated system or network. Such self-
organised network/system will turn into a critical behavior (i.e. tipping point
and phase transition) without the e¤ect of external forces or drivers. In this
light, our main contribution is to provide early warnings of phase transitions
for the whole system (or network), which is highly suggestive of systemic risk.
To detect early warnings, we adopt a two-step methodology. First, we recover
the network topology using non-causality tests as suggested in Billio and al.
(2012). Nevertheless, we use a di¤erent class of Granger non-causality tests,
within the framework of independence tests for time series1 . Such tests are per-
formed on normalized innovations of Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) models in which we allow the variance processes to
have recurrent (Markov-Switching GARCH) or non-recurrent states or regimes
(Changing-Point GARCH). To model series, we adopt the Bayesian Bauwens
et al. (2014) methodology. Independence tests for time series are very versa-
tile and provide a very rich information concerning instantaneous correlations,
non-causality over a given number of lags, or at a given lag. They thus allow
for capturing the complex interplay such as feedbacks and spillover e¤ects, and
are used to build directed and undirected, as well as weighted and binary net-
works here. Despite its apparent simplicity, it has been suggested by Zhou et
al. (2014) in integrate-and-re neuronal systems (see also Winterhalder et al.,
2005) that Granger non-causality can capture non-linear relationships.
Once the topology is recovered, we rst propose a period-specic analysis
of the contagion process within the network while discriminating between crisis
and non-crisis periods. We mainly show that the nodesstates are highly un-
1See Hong (1996), Duchesne and Roy (2001), Koch and Yang (1986), El Himdi and Roy
(1997), Pham et al. (2001), Hallin and Saidi (2001) among others.
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stable over time. Expanding on this idea, we identify phase transitions based
on the very short-term dynamic di¤usion process of information/shocks accross
nodes. Such nodes short-term di¤usion processes are interpreted as signals.
Our dynamic signal analysis relies on a six-month rolling window, and focuses
on triangular clustering patterns or motifs of information di¤usion as dened
by Faggiolo (2007), including spillover and feedback e¤ects.
Considering daily data about ten main European stock indices form 1994
to 2014, our ndings are manyfold: i) With respect to period-specic analysis,
correlations prevail over the data sample and are regime-dependent. Such corre-
lations increase up to the period following the crisis, and then start decreasing,
ii) Besides, the number of causal relationships as well as their strength increases
up to the crisis period but vanishes after the crisis period. Over the remain-
ing sample history, there exist very few and very weak causal relationships, iii)
Based on a rolling window analysis, we rst show that periods of clustering
precede periods of ickering in clustering, which are followed by a tipping point
and a phase transition. The phase transition begins with an abrupt clustering
phenomenon for all stock exchanges. Such sudden phenomenon indicates a si-
multaneous phase transition of all stock markets (i.e. synchronized clusters).
Interestingly, ickering periods also highlight times when stock exchanges ex-
hibit desynchronized information ow processes. In particular, Euro zone stock
exchanges exhibit clustersdesynchronization approximately one year before the
Global Financial Crisis. At last, the end-of-crisis period exhibits an exceptional
and specic clustering phenomenon, which is followed by the sudden disappear-
ance of clusters. Hence European stock exchanges seem to stop interacting
together. To our knowledge, we are the rst to study clustering, or equiva-
lently, information di¤usion patterns within causal networks. Clearly, ickering
in clustering as well as desynchronization in information transmission patterns
could serve as early warnings indicators of phase transition on the market.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the econometric
methodology. Section 3 focuses on the statistical properties of the data and
applies the Bauwens et al. (2014) methodology. Section 4 implements period-
specic independence and non-causality tests on ltered and orthogonalized
data. Section 5 focuses on early warning indicators of crisis. Finally, Section 6
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concludes.
2 Econometric methodology
Let r = f(r(1)0t ; r(2)0t ; :::; r(N)0t )0; t 2 Zg be a set of N log-returns of a main index
of a stock-exchange, observed over T periods. Assume that each component
of r admits a Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedastic process
(GARCH) representation (Bollerslev, 1986):
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Moreover, as T becomes large, consider that returns might also exhibit breaks in
their volatility process. Then, dene a more realistic Data Generating Process
(DGP) as:
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Equation (7) allows the parameters in the variance equation to switch from one
value to another. We focus on two kinds of switching processes: i) Switch-
ing processes with recurrent states, i.e. Markov-Switching (MS-) GARCH (see
Francq and Zakoian, 2008), ii) Switching processes with non-recurrent states, i.e.
Change-Point (CP-) GARCH (He and Maheu, 2010). Let ST = fs1; s2; :::; sT g0,
the latent process fstg is a rst-order Markovian process with transition matrix
either dened by:
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where pij = P [st = jjst 1 = i];
or by:
PC =
0BBBBBBBBB@
p11 1  p11 0 0 0
0 p22 1  p22 0 0
0 0 0 pKK 1  pKK
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCA
:
where PS corresponds to a Markov switching process withK+1 regimes, and
PC describes a change-point process with K breaks. Then, dene the estimated
normalized return b(i)t = (bh(i)t ) 1=2b(i)t , i = 1; 2; :::; N:
Next, we build binary and weighted undirected networks (BUN, WUN) as
well as binary and weighted directed networks (BDN, WDN). A binary network
is described by a graph G = (N;A), where N is the number of nodes, here the
number of stocks, and A = faijg is the N  N adjacency matrix. For binary
networks, nodes i and j are connected by an edge if aij = 1. For a graph
G = (N;A), dene the indegree, outdegree and total degree for node i as:
dini =
X
j 6=i
aji = (A
0)i1 (9)
douti =
X
j 6=i
aij = (A)i1 (10)
dtoti = d
in
i + d
out
i = (A
0 +A)i1 (11)
where A0 is the transpose of A:
Also of interest are the bilateral edges between i and j, i.e. aij = 1 and
aji = 1:
d$i =
X
j 6=i
aijaji = A
2
ii (12)
The weighted networks parallel the binary one. They are dened by the graph
G = (N;W) where W = fwijg is a matrix of weights ranging from 0 to 1.
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Then, replacing in (9) to (11) A byW one can focus on the strength of a node,
and the strength of the net.
To build BUN, WUN, BDN and WDN, i.e. to recover the topology of the
network, we use non-correlation, or independence tests for time series. These
tests are very versatile and are based on normalized residuals cross-correlations
of models (1) or (5). They encompass several tests: i) Non-signicance of a cross-
correlation at a lag k = 0 or k 2 f1;Mg, ii) Portmanteau test to check for
overall independence, i.e. non-signicance of all leads and lags, iii) Portmanteau
tests to check for non-causality in the Granger sense. Independence tests for
time series have been introduced by Haugh (1976). They have been extended by
Hong (1996), Duchesne and Roy (2003) or Koch and Yang (1986), this latter also
taking into account patterns in cross-correlations. El Himdi and Roy (1997),
Pham et al. (2001) or Hallin and Saidi (2001) among other present multivariate
extensions. Also, El Himdi et al. (2003) propose a nonparametric test. In
this paper we have used the El Himdi and Roy (1997), Hallin and Saidi (2001)
and El Himdi et al. (2003) approaches, as well as several renements2 . Having
obtained very similar results, in the sequel, only the ones based on the El Himdi
and Roy (1997) methodology are presented.
Generally, let b(1) = fb(1)t ; t 2 Zg and b(2) = fb(2)t ; t 2 Zg be two sets of
ltered series using univariate or multivariate models, i.e. (normalized) residuals
of models estimated independently with values in Rd1 and Rd2. Dene the
covariances and cross-covariances C(hh)b (0) and C(12)b (k) as:
C
(hh)b (0) = T 1
TX
i=1
b(h)t b(h)0t ; h = 1; 2 (13)
C
(12)b (k) =
8<: T 1
PT
i=1 b(1)t b(2)0t k 0  k  T   1
T 1
PT
i=1 b(1)t b(2)0t k 1  T  k  0: (14)
the correlations and cross-correlations are dened as:
R
(hh)b (0) = fdiag C(hh)b (0)g 1=2C(hh)b (0)fdiag C(hh)b (0)g 1=2 (15)
and:
R
(12)b (k) = fdiag C(11)b (0)g 1=2C(12)b (k)fdiag C(22)b (0)g 1=2 (16)
2 In particular, instead of cross correlations, we have also used partial cross-correlations
and then used a LR test. All codes available at peretti@univ-paris1.fr
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Then the null of non-correlation or independence can be tested using the port-
manteau statistic:
QM = T
MP
k= M
T
T   jkj

vec R(12)b (k)
0 
R
(22)b (0)
R(11)b (0)
 1 
vec R(12)b (k)

(17)
Under the null of non-signicance of cross correlations at all leads and lags, QM
is distributed as a Chi-square with (2M + 1)d1d2 degrees of freedom.
Using the above statistic,Granger non-causality tests are easy to derive by
summing over f1;Mg or f M; 1g. For instance, testing for Granger non-
causality from X(2) to X(1) (X(2) ; X(1)) amounts to computing the test
statistic:
Q+M = T
MP
k=1
T
T   k

vec R(12)b (k)
0 
R
(22)b (0)
R(11)b (0)
 1 
vec R(12)b (k)

(18)
Similarly, to test for non-causality from X(1) to X(2) (X(1) ; X(2)), one is to
use:
Q M = T
 MP
k= 1
T
T   jkj

vec R(12)b (k)
0 
R
(22)b (0)
R(11)b (0)
 1 
vec R(12)b (k)

(19)
Under the null, both tests (18) and (19) are chi-square distributed with Md1d2
degrees of freedom.
All above tests are portmanteau tests. It is also useful to look at the signif-
icance of an individual lead/lag. A natural test statistic is given by:
Q(k) = T
T
T   jkj

vec R(12)b" (k)
0 
R
(22)b" (0)
R(11)b" (0)
 1 
vec R(12)b" (k)

(20)
which is also chi-square distributed with d1d2 degrees of freedom.
In this paper, to build BUN and WUN we use (17) with k = 0 and M = 7
and (20) with k = 0. Therefore, an edge exists between two nodes, if the test
is rejected at the 5% threshold. For BDN and WDN we use (18), (19) and (20)
with k 6= 0;M = 7 (and M = 1 for 20), and this for each pair of the set b.
3 Data properties and orthogonalization
Table (1) displays benchmark stock market indices as well as related ARCH-
LM test statistics for the ten European countries under consideration as well
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as U.S.A. (SP500 index return). The analysis is based on daily data spanning
January 1998 to May 2014. Except for one return series, all series exhibit non-
null skewness and excess kurtosis. Moreover, as expected, all series exhibit
second-order dependence.
Please insert Table (1) about here
To test for breaks in volatility processes, and discriminate between recurrent
(MS-GARCH) and non-recurrent (CP-GARCH) regimes, we follow Bauwens et
al. (2014). The methodology on a Bayesian approach which combines sequential
Monte Carlo (SMC) and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. For
each model, we perform 10,000 particle Gibbs iterations. After convergence in
the Geweke sense (Geweke, 1992), we then compute the marginal likelihood
by bridge sampling (1,000 iterations). The number of particles is set to 150 for
changing point models, and 250 for Markov Switching models. Finally, we select
the model for which the marginal likelihood is maximal.
Please, insert Table (2) about here
Table (2) displays the results of the Bauwens et al. (2014) Bayesian pro-
cedure. Results support a no-break model for AEX and a two-break model
(i.e. three non-recurrent states) for ASE. All other series exhibit a recurrent
two-state Markov-Switching process (i.e. high and low volatility regimes). In
the sequel, normalized residuals will be based on these models. With regard to
SP500, our results are similar to Bauwens et al. (2014), as shown by Figure (1).
Please insert Figure (1) about here
Using the above procedure, we build two sets of normalized residuals b =
fb(1)0t ;b(2)0t ; :::;b(10)0t ; t 2 Zg =f((bh(1)t ) 1=2b(1)t )0; ((bh(2)t ) 1=2b(2)t )0; :::; ((bh(10)t ) 1=2b(10)t )0; t 2
Zg corresponding to European stock exchanges, and bBench = fb(11)0t ; t 2
Zg =f((bh(11)t ) 1=2b(11)t )0; t 2 Zg corresponding to the SP500. Once data are
ltered by the proper Data Generating Process, we further need to adress a
key issue. To build networks, we use non-correlation and non-causality tests
between each pair of nodes, i.e. between each pairs of b. Nevertheless, it is
well known that in bivariate systems, non-causality and non-correlation tests
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might be biased due to the omitted variable problem (i.e. spurious relation-
ships, see e.g. Triacca, 1998). To tackle this issue, we consider the SP500 index
as a central variable which inuences all European exchanges. We then adopt
the Duchesne and Nkwimi (2013) methodology to orthogonalize series with re-
spect to the causal structure of another series. The orthogonalization method
is a two-step procedure. First, we compute the cross-correlations between each
component of b and bBench. For each k 2 f0; :::;Mg, we compute the test
statistics (20) and keep the signicant lags. Then, we regress fb(i)t gTt=1 on the
signicant lags of fb(bench)t gTt=1,and keep the corresponding residuals fb"(i)t gTt=1.
Doing this for each European stock index i = 1; 2; :::; N , we build a set of N = 10
orthogonalized series b" = f(b"(1)0t ;b"(2)0t ; :::;b"(N)0t )0; t 2 Zg with regard to SP500
index. In the sequel, all tests are implemented on this set.
4 Period-based analysis
We rst perform our analysis over 6 di¤erent periods given by Table (3). As
mentioned above, three kinds of networks can be built: i) Networks where nodes
are connected if the null of independence is rejected at 5%, ii) Networks where
nodes are connected if non-causality is rejected at 5%, also called functional
connectivity, iii) Networks where nodes are connected if for a given lead/lag the
null of non-signicance of the individual cross-correlation is rejected.
Please insert Table (3) about here
Results are summarized by both heatmaps and networks. To build heatmaps,
we use both total degrees (11) and weights. To compute weights ranging from
0 to 1 for a single node, and as all tests of connectivity are based on sums of
individual (squared) cross-correlations or on individual cross-correlations at a
given lag, we proceed as follows. For independence and non-causality tests and
for each period, we divide the test statistics by the maximal value obtained
over one period. For individual lags, we just take the absolute value of the
cross-correlations.
Please insert here Figure (2) about here
10
Figure (2) displays the heatmaps resulting from independence tests for K =
7. Focusing on degrees (upper panel), all stock exchanges are highly intercon-
nected over the rst 5 periods whereas, over the last period, Greece disconnects
from the network of Euro zone stock exchanges. Moreover, the total degree
slightly decreases (i.e. less interconnections) for all stock markets except for
Ireland and Portugal. As regards strength (lower panel), which ranges from 0
to 9, the main striking feature is the abrupt change in the strength of depen-
dence among stock exchanges after the post-crisis period. During the crisis, the
strength of the network increases, remains high during the post-crisis period,
and then seems to vanish. As a result, the closer we get to the crisis period,
the more mutually dependent stock exchanges become, due to the increasing
strength of their network. All stock exchanges being connected during the cri-
sis, connections strength reaches their highest level by that time. However,
some stock exchanges start disconnecting after the crisis period. Furthermore,
Greece exhibits a weak connection to the Euro zone network of stock exchanges.
Thus, even if the Greek stock exchange is risky, its has a reduced impact on
other Euro zone stock exchanges.
Figures (3) and (4) provide a deeper analysis of the Euro zone network of
stock exchanges while focusing solely on either non-correlation or non-causality
tests. Focusing on non-correlation tests, Figure (3) provides a similar informa-
tion as previous heatmaps because Euro zone stock exchanges are highly cor-
related. Specically, all stock exchanges are strongly interrelated, and strength
begins to increase before the Global Financial Crisis, being maximal during and
just after the Global Financial Crisis. Such clustering phenomenon emphasizes
the strong simultaneous and joint reaction of stock exchanges. However, there
is an abrupt downturn in the networks strength after the post-crisis period so
that some stock exchanges start disconnecting.
As regards non-causality tests (K = 7), Figure (4) provides key informations
about both the reception (i.e. incoming information) and transmission (i.e.
outgoing information) of nancial shocks across stock market places. Before
the Global Financial Crisis, the degrees of the network are quite high up to
the crisis period, and then vanish. A similar result appears when one focuses
on the strength of the network. Strikingly at the end of sample (over period
11
6) only three stock exchanges are weakly interconnected from a causal point of
view. Such feature suggests the absence of dynamic interrelations over the recent
periods, and thus a low risk of contagion (i.e. almost non-existing spillover and
no feedback e¤ects).
Please insert here Figures (3) and (4)
The network representations corresponding to heatmaps in Figure (4) are
illustrated by Figures (5), (6) and (7). Corresponding network representations
are provided for the six periods covering the data sample (see Table 3). Such
gures emphasize the evolution of the dynamic causal network of Euro zone
stock exchanges over time. Specically, the networks density increases up to the
crisis period, diminishes during the post-crisis period, starts increasing during
the sovereign debt crisis period, and then strongly drops over the post-sovereign
debt crisis period. Over the last period of the sample, there are very few causal
relationships between Euro zone stock exchanges. Moreover, previous gures
display incoming and outgoing connections between the networks nodes (i.e.
between stock exchanges). Thus, we observe clearly the directional propagation
of shocks across stock market places over time.
Please insert here Figures (5), (6) and (7)
5 Flickering in information transmission
One major result of the previous section is that the topology of the network
changes from one period to another. Specically, information transmission chan-
nels within the network are unstable over time, which leads to complex patterns
of transmitted and emitted signals. It is therefore of interest to focus on such
an unstability in order to: i) Check if the evolution of certain patterns of infor-
mation transmission match with the di¤erent phases of the nancial market as
reported in Table (3), ii) Determine early warning indicators, preceding tipping
points or phase transitions.
Please insert Table (4) about here
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We use a six-month rolling window, and focus on the very short-term (K1)
information di¤usion schemes, and in particular, on specic triangular patterns
or motifs as dened by Faggiolo (2007). Table (4) introduces the denitions
for four types of clustering coe¢ cients (Cji ; j = Cyc;Out;Mid; In) as well as
the total clustering coe¤cient (CDi ) for BDNs and WDNs. For a node i, the
cycle pattern (Cyc) corresponds to feedback e¤ects and the out pattern (Out)
to spillovers. In the middleman pattern (Mid), the node i appears to be a relay
in the information propagation (i.e. intermediate transmitter). In the in pattern
(In) , the node receives information from its neighbors (i.e. receiver). Thus,
all complex interactions are well captured by the various clustering coe¢ cients
under consideration.
Results are displayed in Figures (8), (10) and (11). Figure (8) plots the
heatmap of total clustering for BDNs (upper panel), ranging from 0 to 1. This
Figure also displays an indicator of crisis (grey) and non crisis (white) peri-
ods as mentionned in Table (3). Such indicator is labelled Regimes. For a
comparison purpose, we also plot the time-path of the density of the network
(lower panel). Figure (10) plots heatmaps for each kind of triangular patterns
for BDNs. At last, we average the total clustering coe¢ cients of WDNs over
each rolling window (see Figure 11).
Interpreting clustering in dynamic networks as emitted or received signals,
allows to study the whole dynamics of the system. The heatmap of total clus-
tering (Figure 8) unveils key information. Starting from the Dot.com bubble,
each return series, except for Greece, does exhibit very large periods of clus-
tering with variable intensities. Then, around March 2001, clustering abruptly
stops, and the system turns into a ickering period so that some nodes alter-
nate between clustering and non-clustering states. During such periods, each
node ickers between being in and out the information di¤usion process. At
the same time, periods of clustering become shorter. In other words, the net-
works nodes continually become active or inactive, emphasizing that we face an
ever-changing network (Odum and Barret, 2005) in terms of information trans-
mission. This rapid alternation of states does precede a phase transition, the
market entering then the pre-crisis period. The beginning of the transition is
characterized by a sudden rise of clustering for all stock exchanges at nearly the
13
same time. Focusing on the pre-crisis period, similar patterns are found. From
the beginning of the pre-crisis period to early 2005, the whole system exhibits
a high degree of clustering, especially after 2004. Then, abruptly in early 2005,
the system starts to icker, alternating between clustering and non-clustering
states. Such feature is also reected in the density of the network in early 2006,
and more specically in the average clustering coe¢ cient (Figure 11). Hence,
compared to Billio et al. (2012), the relevant information, may not be the in-
crease in degrees before a nancial crisis, but rather the ickering in degrees,
which occurs after their increase (e.g. during the pre-crisis period).
Focusing on the Global Financial Crisis period, it is interesting to notice that
it begins with an abrupt change in clustering (phase transition) for the whole
system, and also ends with an abrupt change. Over the post crisis period,
clustering totaly disappears, which is line with our previous causality tests.
Anecdotal results show that the sovereign debt crisis period begins and ends with
a sudden rise in clustering. As a consequence, our methodologys added-values
are twofold. First, we are able to detect forthcoming phase transitions, and
second, we are able to date crisesbeginnings and ends. Such dating matches
with the di¤erent market phases reported in Table (3). Therefore ickering
precedes a phase transition and acts as an early warning.
Flickering phenomena as early warning signals have been reported in complex
systems, especially in ecology (e.g. Dakos et al., 2013) as well as in climatology
(Livina et al., 2010). Interestingly, Dakos et al. (2013) noticed that ickering
between basins of attraction may appear far before bifurcation or tipping points,
and could then be used as early warnings. To our knowledge, this is the rst
time that ickering in information di¤usion processes is studied, exhibited and
described in nancial systems.
In addition to rapid ickering, before a tipping point occurs, the informa-
tion di¤usion process starts desynchronizing accross nodes. We observe either
asynchonicity of signals or arising noises within the system. To handle such
pattern, we compute a dummy variable taking a unit value if the node enters
total clustering, and 0 otherwise. Then, we divide the pre-crisis period into four
equal sub-samples, and compute the Jaccard similarity coe¢ cient over each
sub-sample to capture the transition from synchronicity to asynchronicity. The
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Jaccard similarity coe¢ cient is a pairwise correlation index which checks for
the similarity in the date of appearance of clusters. Corresponding results are
displayed in Figure (12). The darker the color, the more synchronous the nodes
become. Synchronization is strong over the two rst sub-periods (except for
Portugal), and then vanishes. Indeed, over the third sub-sample, the network
starts desynchronizing. Over the fourth sub-period, there is a disconnection
in the information transmission patterns, shown by a decrease of most pairwise
correlations. However, the network still exhibits a weak synchronous core, which
is composed of Germany, Italy, France and UK. Such feature suggests that, just
before the Global Financial Crisis, we have a core network that remains weakly
synchronized, and a periphery network, which is fully desynchronized.
Please insert Figure (8) about here
As a conclusion, shocks are continually di¤used and absorbed within the
network a long time before the crisis occurs. All the systems components (i.e.
stock exchanges) interact in a synchronous way. Di¤erently, before the crisis,
shocks are di¤used and absorbed in a discontinuous and asynchronous manner
by networks components. Information di¤usion patterns become intermittent
(i.e. ickering phenomenon), which announces a forthcoming phase transition
(i.e. a crisis). The ickering phenomenon appears approximately one year before
the crisis. Therefore our results suggest that ickering acts as an early warning
signal, and the degree of desynchonization reveals the vicinity of the tipping
point.
Please insert Figures (11) (12) (10), and about here
6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamic relationships among ten European
stock exchanges. We have focused on networks where two nodes are connected
by functional or causal connectivity. Instantaneous correlations are also consid-
ered. Our major ndings are manyfold. Using a period-based analysis, we have
found that the network of Euro zone stock exchanges was unstable over time,
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so that the number of connections and their related strength were highly time-
varying. Strikingly, there remain very few causal relationships at the end of our
data sample (i.e. post-sovereign debt crisis period), indicating that contagion
over these recent years seems to be low. Such information is of huge signicance
to the regulatory authority (e.g. monitoring and marking-to-market processes,
assessment of risk exposures, gauging contagion risk). Expanding on the un-
stability of the topology, we have focused on motifs of information di¤usion
processes (i.e. triangular clusters) in order to capture early warnings of phase
transition. We have shown that the whole system exhibited ickering informa-
tion clusters with a high degree of desynchronization before a phase transition
occurs. As a consequence, ickering in information transmission can act as an
early warning signal, and the degree of desynchonization reveals the vicinity of a
tipping point. Our analysis, also allows to date crisis periods. To our knowledge,
this is the rst time that ickering in clusters is identied in complex nancial
systems. The ability to extract early warnings about forthcoming crises is use-
ful to regulators in order to take preventive measures and mitigate contagion
risk. Such tool could e¢ ciently help regulators undertake their monitoring and
supervisory activities.
There is an avenue for future research within this area. One would consist in
enlarging our dataset to include credit defaults swaps as well as bonds. Another
direction could be to study cascading errors, and then relating our network to
the riskiness of nodes.
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7 Tables and graphs to be included in the paper
Table 1: Description and statistical properties of index returns
Country Index Mean Variance Skew. Kurt. ARCH(4)
France CAC40 0.0002 0.0002 0.05 4.29 469.06 (0)
Netherland AEX 0.0001 0.0002 -0.10 5.50 634.78 (0)
Greece ASE 0.00003 0.0003 -0.02 3.11 337.43 (0)
Belgium BEL20 0.0001 0.0001 0.05 5.63 555.97 (0)
Germany DAX 0.0002 0.0002 -0.05 3.83 524.29 (0)
Italy FTSEMIB 0.00005 0.0002 -0.12 3.88 512.71 (0)
Spain IBEX 0.0002 0.0002 0.00 4.19 482.80 (0)
Ireland ISEQ 0.0001 0.0002 -0.61 7.19 526.78 (0)
Portugal PSI 0.00005 0.0001 -0.27 7.02 301.96 (0)
U.K. UKX 0.0002 0.0001 -0.10 5.81 634.65 (0)
USA SP500 0.0002 0.0001 -0.20 6.58 745.58 (0)
Note: P-values are given between parentheses. ARCH-LM test is performed at lag 4.
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Table 2: Marginal likelihoods
Regimes
1 2 3 4 5
AEX MS-GARCH -6293.57 -6294.14 -6296.68
AEX CP-GARCH -6293.57 -6298.78 -6297.46 -6302.92 -6307.9
ASE MS-GARCH -7484.95 -7440.39 -7462.49
ASE CP-GARCH -7484.96 -7464.58 -7433.67 -7437.97 -7437.66
BEL20 MS-GARCH -5855.88 -5845.54 -5859.66
BEL20 CP-GARCH -5855.88 -5856.19 -5855.08 -5854.99 -5857.82
CAC40 MS-GARCH -6575.57 -6570.94 -6576.87
CAC40 CP-GARCH -6575.58 -6579.27 -6579.17 -6576.07 -6582.44
DAX MS-GARCH -6672.93 -6671.32 -6680.63
DAX CP-GARCH -6672.93 -6677.58 -6681.49 -6684.95 -6688.8
FTSEMIB MS-GARCH -6587.34 -6579.35 -6587.89
FTSEMIB CP-GARCH -6587.34 -6586.1 -6579.63 -6579.42 -6589.55
IBEX MS-GARCH -6678.06 -6669.91 -6675.54
IBEX CP-GARCH -6678.15 -6679.26 -6673.07 -6675.38 -6681.4
ISEQ MS-GARCH -6155.85 -6141.69 -6157.37
ISEQ CP-GARCH -6155.83 -6155.25 -6155.85 -6145.67 -6156.4
PSI MS-GARCH -5749.94 -5728.98 -5750.49
PSI CP-GARCH -5749.93 -5747.45 -5732.02 -5736.89 -5731.67
UKX MS-GARCH -5692.76 -5691.33 -5698.55
UKX CP-GARCH -5692.75 -5691.44 -5694.12 -5697.48 -5698.27
SP500 MS-GARCH -5775.66 -5765.51 -5776.65
SP500 CP-GARCH -5775.66 -5777.91 -5771.92 -5767.62 -5768.15
Table 3: Periods of the analysis
Name Dates
1 Dot.com bubble 07JAN98-09OCT02
2 Pre-crisis 10OCT02-02JUL07
3 Crisis 03JUL07-01MAY09
4 Post-crisis 02MAY09-30APR10
5 Sovereign debt crisis 01MAY10-31MAR13
6 Post-sovereign debt crisis 01APR13-20MAY14
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Table 4: Patterns of triangles and clustering coe¢ cients (CC)
Patterns CCs for BDNs CCs for WDNs
Cycle CCyci =
(A)3ii
dini d
out
i  d$i
CCyci =
(W )3ii
dini d
out
i  d$i
Middleman CMidi =
(AA0A)ii
dini d
out
i  d$i
CMidi =
(WW 0W )ii
dini d
out
i  d$i
In CIni =
(A0A2)ii
dini (d
in
i  1)
CIni =
(W 0W 2)ii
dini (d
in
i  1)
Out COuti =
(A2A0)ii
douti (d
out
i  1) C
Out
i =
(W 2W 0)ii
douti (d
out
i  1)
Total CDi =
(A+A0)3ii
2TDi
CDi =
(W+W 0)3ii
2TDi
Note: TDi is the total number of triangular patterns that node i can form.
Figure 1: SP500 square returns, and unconditional variance for a two-regime
MS-GARCH process.
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Figure 2: Independence tests. Total degrees and total strength of the network.
Figure 3: Instantaneous correlations. Total degrees and total strength of the
network.
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Figure 4: Causality. Total degrees and total strength of the network.
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Figure 8: Total clustering. Six-month rolling window.
Figure 9: Density of the network. Six-month rolling windows.
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Figure 10: Four di¤erent kinds of clustering.
Figure 11: Average clustering coe¢ cient for WDNs and ickering periods.
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Figure 12: Jaccard similarity coe¢ cients for four di¤erent (pre-crisis) sub-
periods.
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